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Abstract
This paper develops a two-dimensional structural framework for valuing credit default swaps
and corporate bonds in the presence of default contagion. Modelling the values of related
firms as correlated geometric Brownian motions with exponential default barriers, analytical
formulae are obtained for both credit default swap spreads and corporate bond yields. The
credit dependence structure is influenced by both a longer-term correlation structure as well
as by the possibility of default contagion. In this way, the model is able to generate a
diverse range of shapes for the term structure of credit spreads using realistic values for input
parameters.
1 Introduction
Firms do not operate in isolation and company defaults are not independent. In reality a whole
network of links exists between companies in related businesses, industries and markets and
the impact of individual credit events can ripple through the market as a form of contagion.
It is thus of fundamental importance when modelling credit, not only to understand the
drivers of credit risk at an individual company, but also the dependence structure between
related companies. Whether accounting for counterparty risk in the price of a single-name
credit derivative, or considering credit risk in a portfolio context, an understanding of credit
dependence is essential to accurate risk evaluation and pricing.
Credit weakness, ratings downgrades and ultimately corporate default can occur in three main
ways. Firstly, a company may be adversely affected for reasons specific to that company alone
(e.g. poor financial management). Secondly, credit weakness may occur due to a factor or
factors impacting multiple companies – whether in the form of a cyclical influence related
to the economy, or a market-wide shock such as an earthquake or September 11th. Finally,
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companies are related through ties, some of which are real (e.g. a trade-creditor agreement),
others of which are purely a matter of perception – for example the fear of accounting fraud.
Credit dependence then occurs primarily through two mechanisms – either as a direct conse-
quence of a common driving factor, or due to inter-company ties. The latter can be thought
of as a form of contagion.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the importance of considering a more complete de-
pendence structure than is usually incorporated in credit models, one that better reflects
reality, taking into account both a common driving influence and the possibility of idiosyn-
cratic company links. To do so, whilst retaining some degree of analytical tractability, we
consider a two-dimensional structural model with default as the first hitting time of an ex-
ponential barrier. Firm values are modelled as correlated geometric Brownian motions and
the default event is contagious. In this way, we are able to capture the two facets of the
dependence structure. The correlation in firm values reflects a longer-term common driving
influence on corporate strength whilst default contagion represents a direct link between the
fortunes of both companies. As discussed in Section 3, this framework results in a model that
is asymmetric with regard to default risk, a significant improvement on prior models.
Structural models, whilst far from straightforward mathematically, are far more grounded
in economic fundamentals than many other models and thus form a good starting point for
a realistic description of credit dynamics. Giesecke (2004), Scho¨nbucher (2003) and Lando
(2004) provide a good introduction to structural models, their development since first intro-
duced by Merton (1974), and their traditional place within credit modelling. Until recently,
the vast majority of work on the structural model has focused on the case of a single firm. In-
deed, two popular commercial packages, Moody’s KMV and CreditGradesTM , are motivated
by the single-firm structural model1. Very little, however, has been published for multiple
companies, with the market mainly focused on copulas or conditionally independent factor
models2 in the multivariate case. Two exceptions are the papers by Zhou (2001) and Hull and
White (2001). Zhou (2001) calculates default correlations for two firms whose asset values are
modelled as correlated Brownian motions. Hull and White (2001) extend this to framework
to higher dimensions and proceed numerically in a discrete-time setting, proposing a method
to calibrate piecewise constant default barriers to a term structure of default hazard rates.
In contrast, we extend the framework used in Zhou (2001) to incorporate default contagion
and derive analytical formulae for bond yields and CDS spreads.
Copula methods, which allow the dependence structure of a portfolio to be considered inde-
pendently from individual default times, are easy to implement and have rapidly become the
market standard for modelling portfolios of credits. However, as basically static models able
only to model expected defaults over a given time period, they fail to allow for suitable credit
spread dynamics and tend to exhibit time instabilities.3 Furthermore, the copula approach
has no notion of default cause and effect as exists in a contagion mechanism.
As problems have arisen with the widespread market use of copulas, multidimensional struc-
1Further details of these approaches can be found at www.moodyskmv.com and in Finger et al. (2002),
respectively.
2For a good overview of the use of copulas in finance, see Cherubini et al. (2004); Scho¨nbucher (2003)
provides a useful summary and references for factor models.
3Mikosch (2006) provides a critical discussion of the widespread usage of copula methods; some countering
arguments are given by Genest and Remillard (2006).
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tural models are seeing renewed interest. Hull et al. (2005) price CDO tranches in a structural
framework where assets are driven by a common factor. In this way, defaults are modelled in
a dynamic setting, and firm value correlations can be time-dependent or stochastic, however
the dependence structure stems purely from the correlated firm values and so is unable to
account for any default causality or contagion. In another approach, Luciano and Schoutens
(2005), Moosbrucker (2006) and Baxter (2006) assume that firm values are driven by Levy
processes rather than geometric Brownian motions. By assuming that firm values are mod-
elled as geometric Brownian motions time-changed by a common Gamma business time, firm
values become Variance Gamma processes, allowing for a richer characterisation of spread dy-
namics. Dependence is introduced through having a common stochastic time change, which
may then be further broken down into systematic and idiosyncratic components, with a num-
ber of different representations proposed by the various authors. The resultant dependence
structure is more realistic and flexible but does not incorporate any form of default contagion.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we outline the framework for the model, its
assumptions and underlying results. We consider both the most general formulation and cases
in which the formulae simplify. Formulae and results for corporate bond yields are provided
in Section 3, whilst those for credit default swap spreads are in Section 4. We summarise and
consider future extensions in Section 5. Mathematical details are in the appendix.
2 The Model
We consider two companies, firm values Vi, i = 1, 2. Each company issues equity and a
single homogeneous class of debt, assumed to be a zero coupon bond, Ci(t, T ), par value Ki,
maturity T . For simplicity we assume that both bonds have the same maturity date but the
analysis is easily extendible to different maturity dates.
For each company, firm value is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion, with default
as the first time that the value of the firm hits a lower default barrier bi(t). As in Merton
(1974) and Black and Cox (1976), we assume that a firm’s value can be constructed from
tradable securities and so in the risk-neutral pricing measure, for i = 1, 2,
dVi(t) = (rf − qi)Vidt+ σiVidWi(t)
where the risk-free rate, rf , dividend yields, qi, and volatilities, σi, are constants, Wi(t) are
Brownian motions and cov(W1(t),W2(t)) = ρt for constant correlation ρ.
We assume that each company has an exponential default barrier, reflecting the existence of
debt covenants, and denote the default barrier for company i by
bi(t) = Kie
−γi(T−t).
Whilst similar to the barrier formulation in Black and Cox (1976)4, defining the barrier in
this way provides us with additional flexibility, enabling us to change its slope. In particular,
in the special case that the barrier growth rate is set equal to the drift in firm value, the
model simplifies. As neither the barrier growth rate nor the drift in firm value is observable
4Black and Cox (1976) use a barrier of the form ωiKie
−rf (T−t) where 0 ≤ ωi ≤ 1. The similarities and
differences in this formulation compared to the one we use are discussed further in Section 3.
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in practice, this is an attractive simplification. It is by no means necessary for our analysis,
however, and we provide results for the most general case.
Setting
Xi(t) = ln
(
Vi(t)
Vi(0)
e−γit
)
enables us to consider the simpler case of Brownian motion with drift and constant default
barrier Bi = ln
(
bi(0)
Vi(0)
)
≤ 0. Xi(0) = 0 and
Xi(t) = αit+ σiWi(t)
where αi = rf − qi − γi − 12σ2i .
Defining the running minimum
Xi(t) = min
0≤s≤t
Xi(s),
and default time, τi, as the first hitting time of the default barrier,
τi = inf{t : Xi(t) = Bi},
survival probability is then
P(τi > s) = P(X i(s) ≥ Bi).
The key result we use to value credit spreads is the joint survival probability density function
and the resultant joint survival probability, P (t),
P (t) = P(X1(t) ≥ B1,X2(t) ≥ B2) (1)
=
2
βt
ea1B1+a2B2+bt
∞∑
n=1
e−r
2
0/2t sin
(
nπθ0
β
)∫ β
0
sin
(
nπθ
β
)
gn(θ) dθ
where
gn(θ) =
∫ ∞
0
re−r
2/2teA(θ)rI(npi
β
)
(rr0
t
)
dr
a1 =
α1σ2 − ρα2σ1
(1− ρ2)σ21σ2
, a2 =
α2σ1 − ρα1σ2
(1− ρ2)σ1σ22
b = −α1a1 − α2a2 + 1
2
σ21a
2
1 + ρσ1σ2a1a2 +
1
2
σ22a
2
2
tan β = −
√
1− ρ2
ρ
, β ∈ [0, π]
r0 =
1√
1− ρ2
(
B21
σ21
− 2ρB1B2
σ1σ2
+
B22
σ22
)1/2
tan θ0 =
σ1B2
√
1− ρ2
σ2B1 − ρσ1B2 , θ0 ∈ [0, β]
A(θ) = a1σ1 sin(β − θ) + a2σ2 sin θ,
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and I(npi
β
)
(
rr0
t
)
is a modified Bessel’s function. P (t) represents the probability that neither
company hits its default barrier by time t. Correlation between firm values is reflected by β,
with β = π corresponding to perfect correlation, β = π/2 independence and β = 0 perfect
negative correlation. When the drifts in firm value and the default barrier are equal, αi = 0,
leading to ai = 0 = b. The form of P (t) derives from the separation of variables in the
solution of the Fokker-Planck equation governing the evolution of the survival probability
density function. Full details of the calculation methodology can be found in the paper by
Hua et al. (1998) in which double lookbacks are valued using the joint distributions for the
maxima and minima of two correlated Brownian motions. Zhou (2001) uses the same result
to calculate default correlation for two companies with correlated assets. In particular, Zhou5
primarily considers the special case that the barrier growth rate and drift in firm value are
equal, γi = rf − qi − 12σ2i , and shows that
P (t) =
2r0√
2πt
e−r
2
0/4t
∑
n=1,3,...
1
n
sin
(
nπθ0
β
)[
I 1
2
(npi
β
+1)
(
r20
4t
)
+ I 1
2
(npi
β
−1)
(
r20
4t
)]
. (2)
This simplification, implying constant leverage, makes the joint survival probability consid-
erably faster to evaluate. Zhou (2001) found that the assumption had minimal impact on
default correlations for shorter maturities. Supporting this finding we see very little difference
in survival probabilities as the barrier growth rate, γi, is changed for maturities up to five
years. This is reflected in the fact that implied bond yields are not very sensitive to changes
in the barrier growth rate, as illustrated in Figure 4.6
The joint survival probability calculation can also be simplified by selecting values of β for
which the modified Bessel’s function simplifies – for example β = πk for integer k. Unfor-
tunately, since ρ = − cosβ, the majority of these cases correspond to negative values of
correlation and so are of only limited interest in our framework.
3 Bond Yield Calculation
The value of a corporate bond to a bondholder arises from two components – its value on
maturity (should it mature) and its value in the event of default. We consider the t = 0 value
of a zero coupon bond issued by company one, par value K1, maturing at time T , denoted
C1(0, T ). The yield is then
y1(0, T ) = − 1
T
ln
(
C1(0, T )
K1
)
. (3)
We incorporate default contagion by assuming that company one defaults on its outstanding
debt the first time that the value of either company reaches its default barrier. In this
5N.B. The definitions of a1 and a2 in Zhou are the negative of the definitions in this paper. Our formula for
gn(θ) can be reconciled with Zhou’s using double angle formulae and the fact that cos β = −ρ, sin β =
p
1− ρ2.
(His angle α is our angle β.)
6An extensive analysis of survival probability sensitivity to input parameters is contained in Haworth (2006);
here we consider solely the impact of key parameter assumptions with regard to credit spreads, with results
in Section 3.
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way, there are two components to the default mechanism. If the value of firm one declines
sufficiently, the company is forced into bankruptcy – this is due to the direct performance of
the company itself and is exactly the framework used in normal first-passage structural models.
The second way in which company one can default is if company two goes bankrupt, modelled
as the time when the value of company two reaches its default barrier – default contagion. This
would be the situation if company two was essential to the continuing operation of company
one. For example if company two was the only purchaser of company one’s products, as in
the case of a small or regional auto-parts supplier to General Motors.
Our specification of the contagion mechanism implicitly assumes that the full extent of its
existence is not known to the market beforehand,7 as is so often the case. Many links between
companies are very opaque and certainly not fully disclosed. For example, the full nature of
a bank’s loan portfolio is rarely apparent, and there are many instances when banks have
ended up over-exposed to one company or industry. The situations at Parmalat and LTCM
in recent years are cases in point. Another example is the networks of business links that
exist, for example in Italy, when extensive corporate cross-holdings are common. Few of these
are publicly known. Too frequently, the existence or full extent of a company’s relationships
and the consequent investment risks only come to light when problems arise. The goal of our
model is to take the first step in considering the spread implication of these types of links
through the introduction of a contagion process that is simple enough to allow for analytical
solutions. It is worth noting that company two need not default automatically if company
one does. It can continue to operate regardless of the financial viability of company one with
dependence solely through the asset correlation, ρ. As a result, the model is asymmetric with
respect to default risk, in stark contrast with the majority of previous models incorporating
a credit dependence structure.8
This framework is only really realistic for ρ ≥ 0. It is highly unlikely that the bankruptcy of
one company would lead to the immediate default of another, negatively correlated company.
Whilst it is possible to contrive a theoretical example (e.g. a highly diversified company like
General Electric might be key to one of its suppliers, but negatively correlated with it overall),
economically it is rather improbable in practice and so we restrict ourselves to consideration
of 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
Similarly to Black and Cox (1976), we assume that
Payment at maturity = min(ω1V1(T ),K1) provided τ1 > T, τ2 > T
where K1 is the par value of the bond, τi denotes the default time of company i, and ω1 is a
constant write down factor. This factor is the same as used later in the specification of the
payment on default. It represents the fact that in the event of default or a restructuring, a
portion of the defaulting company’s value is lost to bondholders. This is commonly seen in
practice, caused, for example, by restructuring costs or violation of the priority rule allocating
claims in the event of default.
7We are grateful to one of our referees for highlighting this.
8The natural extension of this framework to larger portfolios of companies would be the type of situation
considered in Jarrow and Yu (2001) in which ‘primary’ companies impact ‘secondary’ companies but not vice
versa. A ‘primary’ company is likely to be larger with a greater market impact than a ‘secondary’ company.
For example Microsoft or General Motors compared to a small, local IT or auto component manufacturer.
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Black and Cox (1976) incorporate the write-down factor in the default barrier, but then the
bondholders are always paid in full once the value of the firm at maturity is at least the face
value of the bonds. This seems a little unrealistic since a company would be unable to pay
out its entire value to bondholders. There would be liquidation costs and a company would
not be able to raise its entire value in a refinancing. It therefore makes sense that the firm
value at maturity must be equal to some K1/η1, where ω1 ≤ η1 ≤ 1, for bondholders to be
fully repaid. For simplicity, since fewer parameters are preferable, we assume that the firm
repays bondholders in full for V1(T ) ≥ K1/ω1. This would seem to be an improvement on
the case where full repayment occurs for firm value at maturity of par or more.
Changing to Xi(t) coordinates, the discounted maturity payment, DMP, can be written
DMP = e−rfT
∫ ∞
B2
∫ ∞
d
K1p(x1, x2, T ) dx1 dx2
+ e−rfT
∫ ∞
B2
∫ d
B1
ω1V1(0)e
x1+γ1T p(x1, x2, T ) dx1 dx2
where
p(x1, x2, T ) =
∂2
∂x1∂x2
P(X1(T ) ≤ x1,X2(T ) ≤ x2,X1(T ) ≥ B1,X2(T ) ≥ B2) (4)
is the joint survival probability density function at maturity and
d = ln
K1
ω1V1(0)
− γ1T = B1 − lnω1 ≥ B1.
As outlined in Appendix A, integrating and making a change of variables,
DMP = H1(T )
∞∑
n=1
sin
(
nπθ0
β
)∫ β
0
sin
(
nπθ
β
)
g+n (θ) dθ (5)
+H2(T )
∞∑
n=1
sin
(
nπθ0
β
)∫ β
0
sin
(
nπθ
β
)
g∗n(θ) dθ
where
H1(T ) =
2K1e
−rfT
βT
ea1B1+a2B2+bT e−r
2
0/2T
H2(T ) =
2ω1V1(0)e
(γ1−rf )T
βT
e(a1+1)B1+a2B2+bT e−r
2
0/2T
g+n (θ) =
∫ ∞
d∗(θ)
re−r
2/2T eA(θ)rI(npi
β
)
(rr0
T
)
dr
g∗n(θ) =
∫ d∗(θ)
0
re−r
2/2T e[A(θ)+σ1 sin(β−θ)]rI(npi
β
)
(rr0
T
)
dr
d∗(θ) =
d−B1
σ1
[√
1− ρ2 cos θ + ρ sin θ
] = lnω1
σ1 sin(θ − β) ≥ 0.
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We assume that default occurs the first time that either company hits its default barrier
and that in the event of default, the bondholder receives a percentage of discounted par
value, ω1K1e
−rf (T−τ). This is the same payoff as used by Black and Cox (1976) and is highly
attractive since the discounted default payment then becomes
ω1K1e
−rfT (1− P (T )), (6)
where the joint survival probability P (T ) = P(X1(T ) ≥ B1,X2(T ) ≥ B2) is defined in (1).
By construction, the default payment is worth less than discounted par, and so for consistency
we just need to ensure that it is worth less than the value of the firm at default. Since company
one must be worth at least as much as its default barrier, a sufficient condition is
ω1 ≤ e(rf−γ1)(T−τ1).
Adding together (5) and (6), and using (1) for P (T ), yields can then be calculated using (3).
In order to evaluate (5) and (6) we use the integral form of the modified Bessel’s function,
I(npi
β
)
(rr0
t
)
=
1
π
∫ π
0
e
rr0
t
cosφ cos
(
nπφ
β
)
dφ− 1
π
sin
(
nπ2
β
)∫ ∞
0
e−
rr0
t
cosh s−npis
β ds.
The infinite sums in (5) and (6) converge rapidly to zero, and so this substitution enables
us to approximate solutions by a finite sum of three-dimensional integrals which we evaluate
by numerical quadrature using a sparse grid (for further information regarding sparse grid
methods, see Gerstner and Griebel (1998)). Figures 1 - 6 illustrate results and parameter
sensitivities. As a measure of company strength we consider initial firm value, Vi(0), divided
by the initial level of the barrier, bi(0). We denote this parameter by initial credit quality
and spread sensitivity to it is as would be expected – as initial credit quality declines, spreads
widen significantly. An indicative scaled distance to default, 1σi log(
Vi(0)
bi(0)
), for our parameter
values of σi = 0.2 and initial credit quality of 2 is then 3.5.
In all cases, we see that yields decline as correlation increases. Since default is less likely with
increasing correlation,9 the bond is less risky, bond-holders are not rewarded with such high
returns, increasing the price and reducing the yield.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the yield curve for two values of the write-down factor, ω1. Compar-
ing them, we see that as ω1 decreases, the yield curve inverts. The extent to which payments
are written down clearly has a large impact on yields, particularly at the short-end of the
yield curve. The thick black line, labelled ‘none’ in the figures is the bond yield for a firm
with the same parameter values, but operating in isolation. In other words, a single firm’s
yield when modelled in a first-passage framework, but with no exposure to another company
through default contagion. As one would expect, yields are lower as such a firm’s bonds are
less risky. It is immediately apparent that allowing for default contagion has a significant
impact on yields, especially for longer-dated bonds.
Figure 3 shows the impact of varying ω1 on a five-year bond. Of note, the case when ω1 = 1
corresponds to no write-down on default and in effect the bond becomes risk-free, yielding,
9This is the case whether or not there is default contagion and can be seen from the fact that the probability
of at least one of the companies defaulting in a given time period decreases as they become more correlated.
If Ni denotes default by company i, for i = 1, 2, then P(N1 ∪N2) = P(N1)+ P(N2)− P(N1 ∩N2) and the final
term increases with ρ.
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Figure 1: Implied yield curve, ω1 = 0.7
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Figure 2: Implied yield curve, ω1 = 0.5
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σ1 = σ2 = 0.2,K1 = 100, rf = 0.05,
q1 = q2 = 0, γ1 = γ2 = 0.03, initial credit quality = 2
as we would expect, the risk-free rate of 5% regardless of correlation. ω1 acts in two ways –
it lowers the payment in the event of default and it increases the value the company must be
worth at maturity for bondholders to be repaid in full.
Figure 3: Implied bond yield, varying ω1
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Figure 4: Implied bond yield, varying γi
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
6
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
6.7
6.8
Correlation
γi=0.01
γi=0.03
γi=0.05
γi=0.08
σi = 0.2,K1 = 100, rf = 0.05, ω1 = 0.7,
qi = 0, initial credit quality = 2, T=5
Figure 4 considers the sensitivity of yields to the shape of the default barrier for a 5-year bond
with initial credit quality of two and ω1 = 0.7. Changing the slope of the default barrier has
minimal impact on yields – as the slope increases, default is less likely and yields decrease, but
the impact is fairly small, particularly when considering the dependence on other parameters.
γi has even less impact for shorter maturities, but becomes progressively more important as
time to maturity increases.
Finally, we consider the impact of varying the volatility of firm-value. Figure 5 shows how
yields behave when the volatility of both firms is changed simultaneously. As expected, higher
9
Figure 5: Implied bond yield, varying σi
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Figure 6: Implied bond yield, varying σ2
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volatility leads to a higher likelihood of default and higher yields. In Figure 6 we assume that
the volatility of firm one remains fixed at 0.2 yr−1/2 and we increase the volatility in firm
two. Since we are considering the yield on firm one’s bonds, the increasing riskiness of firm
two impacts yields through the correlation between the two companies and the possibility of
default contagion. As expected, the more volatile firm two is, the riskier firm one and the
higher yielding its bonds.
4 CDS Spread Calculations
Using a similar approach to that in Section 3, we evaluate first and second-to-default credit
default swap (CDS) spreads for a two-company basket.
4.1 First-to-default CDS Basket
We consider a basket of two related companies. The buyer of a first-to-default CDS on
this underlying basket pays a premium, the CDS spread, for the life of the CDS – until
maturity or the first default, whichever happens first. In the event of default by one of
the underlying reference companies, the buyer receives a default payment and the contract
terminates. Denoting the default time of company i by τi, we write τfirst for the time of the
first default,
τfirst = min{τ1, τ2}
where, using the same notation as before,
τi = inf{t : Xi(t) = Bi}.
If bond recovery on default is R, and the protection buyer makes continuous spread payments,
c, on a par value K, then the discounted spread payment (DSP) and discounted default
10
payment (DDP) on the first-to-default basket are
DSP = cK
∫ T
0
e−rf sP(τfirst > s) ds
DDP = (1−R)K
∫ T
0
e−rf sP(s ≤ τfirst ≤ s+ ds) ds (7)
= (1−R)K
∫ T
0
−e−rf s ∂
∂s
P(τfirst > s) ds
= (1−R)K
{
1− e−rfTP(τfirst > T )− rf
∫ T
0
e−rf sP(τfirst > s) ds
}
.
With P (s) defined as in equation (1), the market spread, cfirst, is therefore
cfirst =
(1−R)
{
1− e−rfTP(τfirst > T )−
∫ T
0 rfe
−rf sP(τfirst > s) ds
}
∫ T
0 e
−rf sP(τfirst > s) ds
(8)
=
(1−R)
{
1− e−rfTP (T )− ∫ T0 rfe−rf sP (s) ds
}
∫ T
0 e
−rf sP (s) ds
since
P(τfirst > s) = P(τ1 > s, τ2 > s) = P(X1(s) ≥ B1,X2(s) ≥ B2) = P (s).
4.2 Second-to-default CDS Basket
A second-to-default CDS spread is evaluated in the same way. The purchaser of the swap
receives a payment in the event that both companies default during the life of the swap,
at which point the contract terminates. Denoting τsecond as the time of the second default,
exactly as for (8), the market spread, csecond is
csecond =
(1−R)
{
1− e−rfTP(τsecond > T )−
∫ T
0 rfe
−rf sP(τsecond > s) ds
}
∫ T
0 e
−rf sP(τsecond > s) ds
, (9)
where
P(τsecond > s) = P(τ1 > s) + P(τ2 > s)− P(τ1 > s, τ2 > s). (10)
4.3 CDS Basket Results
In Figures 7 - 12, we consider the impact of correlation on first and second-to-default CDS
spreads for different parameter values. Numerical evaluation is done by numerical quadrature
on a sparse grid as before.
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Figure 7: First-to-default CDS, varying T
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Figure 8: Second-to-default CDS, varying T
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In all cases, with increasing correlation between the two reference entities, first-to-default CDS
spreads decrease, whilst second-to-default CDS spreads increase. This is because the proba-
bility of at least one company defaulting in a given period is higher for negative correlations,
whilst the probability of both defaulting is greater for positive correlations.
Figures 7 and 8 show spreads for first and second-to-default CDS baskets with maturities
of up to 5 years. Initial credit quality is 2 (i.e, as before, firm value is initially twice the
level of the barrier). Spreads are greater for longer-maturity swaps and, as we would expect,
first-to-default spreads are everywhere greater than second-to-default spreads.
Figure 9: First-to-default CDS, varying R
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Figure 10: Second-to-default CDS, varying R
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γ1 = γ2 = 0.03, initial credit quality = 2, T = 5
Figures 9 and 10 illustrate the extent to which CDS spreads depend on our recovery rate as-
sumption. As would be expected, moving from a 30% recovery rate to a 70% recovery rate has
a large impact. However, the overall form of spreads and their variation with changing cor-
relation is the same. In general, taking R=50% is representative of the levels seen in practice
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(see, for example, Bakshi et al. (2006)) and is in line with that used in the CreditGradesTM
approach to modelling credit as described in Finger et al. (2002). An easy extension would
be to set the recovery rate of the reference entities equal to discounted par value.
Figure 11: First-to-default CDS, varying σi
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Figure 12: Second-to-default CDS, varying σi
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Figures 11 and 12 show that firm volatility has a considerable impact on spreads. As the
reference entities become more volatile, both credit default swaps become much more risky
and spreads increase significantly. Of all the parameters, firm volatility has by far the largest
impact on CDS spreads.
Through implementation of the analytical formula for the joint survival probability function,
(1), we are therefore able to illustrate the sensitivity of first and second-to-default CDS
spreads to input parameter assumptions straightforwardly. The importance of the degree of
correlation between reference entities is clearly evident, with spreads significantly different
when the basket is highly correlated than when it is well diversified.
Since by definition default contagion comes into play following the first default, its existence
has no impact on first-to-default spreads. It is, however, important in the consideration of
second-to-default spreads, and introducing the default contagion mechanism considered in
Section 3 clearly has a dramatic impact on second-to-default spreads, in this case making
them equal to first-to-default spreads. This situation is clearly extreme, as a CDS is highly
unlikely to be constructed on such an undiversified basket (unless of course the existence of
the link between firms was completely unknown prior to the first default), however it serves
to highlight the importance of considering the dependence relationship between firms.
4.4 CDS with Counterparty Risk
Consider now a single-name CDS, face-value K, maturity T, on reference company one bought
from a counterparty company two. The purchaser of the CDS makes spread payments for
the life of the CDS – until either the reference company or the counterparty defaults. If the
reference entity defaults during the life of the CDS and before the counterparty, the purchaser
receives a default payment. If, however, the counterparty defaults first, they receive nothing,
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irrespective of whether or not the reference company later defaults. Denoting the default
time of company i by τi, if bond recovery on default is R and the purchaser of protection
makes continuous spread payments, c, for the life of the CDS, then using the same notation
as before, the protection buyer
• makes spread payments for t < min{τ1, τ2, T},
• receives a default payment if τ1 < min{τ2, T},
• receives nothing if τ2 < min{τ1, T}.
In other words, discounted spread and default payments are
Spread = cK
∫ T
0
e−rf sP(τ1 > s, τ2 > s) ds
= cK
∫ T
0
e−rf sP(X1(s) ≥ B1,X2(s) ≥ B2) ds
Default = (1−R)K
{∫ T
0
e−rf sP(s ≤ τ1 ≤ s+ ds, τ2 > s) ds
Considering the default payment for a first-to-default CDS, equation (7),
DDP = (1−R)K
∫ T
0
e−rf sP(s ≤ τfirst ≤ s+ ds) ds (11)
= (1−R)K
∫ T
0
e−rf s
{
P(s ≤ τ1 ≤ s+ ds, τ2 > s) + P(τ1 > s, s ≤ τ2 ≤ s+ ds)
}
ds,
we see that the default payment for a CDS with counterparty, added to its image when the
identity of the reference entity and the counterparty are swapped, gives the value of the first-
to-default swap payment. A similar identity holds for the second-to-default swap payment.
In the case of a homogeneous portfolio, when both reference entities have the same parameters,
(11) can be used to calculate the value of a CDS spread with counterparty risk for all values
of correlation, ρ. More generally, in the asymmetric case a more complicated evaluation must
be done, details of which will be considered elsewhere.
5 Conclusion
Structural models are increasingly the focus of industry attention in the multi-firm setting,
but there has been limited work on the general first passage framework, and little academic
coverage. This paper makes a first and novel, albeit by necessity simplistic, contribution
to this field through the introduction of a contagion mechanism in a two-dimensional first
passage model. Working with a Black and Cox (1976) type structural framework, we have
built on the work by Zhou (2001) to derive analytical formulae for both bond yields and CDS
spreads. We have modified the default barrier to better reflect reality and have incorporated
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default contagion within the structural framework for the first time. The result is a credit
model that is asymmetric with respect to default risk and which has a dependence structure
based on both long-term asset correlation and default contagion.
Results illustrate that the sensitivity of yields to input parameters is as expected, and clearly
demonstrate the importance of credit correlation. Our model enables us to generate corporate
bond yields and CDS spreads across the full range of parameter values in a two-dimensional
first passage framework in full generality. This has not been done before. Previous results
using related analysis in Zhou (2001) (default correlations) and Hua et al. (1998) (double
lookbacks) have concentrated on cases in which the framework simplifies and have been lim-
ited to a few parameter values in these cases. For the first time, we are therefore able to
fully consider spread sensitivity to model and parameter assumptions in the two-dimensional
structural setting.
Our specification of default contagion is clearly not very realistic – default by one company
very rarely leads to direct default by another, although it is possible. More likely, the im-
pact of a corporate bankruptcy causes a ripple of credit weakness through the market as
related companies are impacted.10 Nonetheless, the importance of taking into account credit
interactions is, once again, clearly highlighted.
Dependence modelling is most critical in the analysis and pricing of large basket credit deriva-
tives, such as kth-to-default credit default swap baskets and CDO tranches. These require
the framework to be extended to considerably more than two dimensions. This is an area of
current research interest and is not straightforward since analytical formulae are no longer
possible and numerical solutions become highly problematic with increasing dimension. As
intimated in Section 3, it would be attractive to incorporate a network of asymmetric depen-
dences within a portfolio, enabling the impact of a credit event at one company to cause a
ripple of contagion through other, related, parties.
A Derivation of Maturity Payment
For ease of notation, we denote the joint survival probability transition density
p(x1, x2, t) =
∂2
∂x1∂x2
P(X1(t) ≤ x1,X2(t) ≤ x2,X1(t) ≥ B1,X2(t) ≥ B2)
Proposition A.1 For general A and B,
∫ ∞
B2
∫ B
A
eǫx1p(x1, x2, t) dx1 dx2
=
2
βt
e(a1+ǫ)B1+a2B2+bt
∞∑
n=1
e−r
2
0/2t sin
(
nπθ0
β
)∫ β
0
sin
(
nπθ
β
)
gn(θ) dθ
10We address this numerically in a subsequent paper, Haworth and Reisinger (2006), however analytical
solutions are no longer possible.
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where
gn(θ) =
∫ dB
dA
re−r
2/2te[A(θ)+ǫσ1 sin(β−θ)]rI(npi
β
)
(rr0
t
)
dr
r0 =
1√
1− ρ2
(
B21
σ21
− 2ρB1B2
σ1σ2
+
B22
σ22
)1/2
tan θ0 =
σ1B2
√
1− ρ2
σ2B1 − ρσ1B2 , θ0 ∈ [0, β]
dA =
A−B1
σ1
[√
1− ρ2 cos θ + ρ sin θ
]
dB =
B −B1
σ1
[√
1− ρ2 cos θ + ρ sin θ
]
A(θ) = a1σ1 sin(β − θ) + a2σ2 sin θ,
Proof
Using notation from Section 2, by Hua et al. (1998)
p(x1, x2, t) =
2ea1x1+a2x2+bt
βtσ1σ2
√
1− ρ2
∞∑
n=1
e−(r
2+r20)/2t sin
(
nπθ0
β
)
sin
(
nπθ
β
)
I(npi
β
)
(rr0
t
)
.
Changing variables,
x1 = B1 +
√
(1− ρ2)σ1r cos θ + ρσ1r sin θ (12)
x2 = B2 + σ2r sin θ,
the Jacobian for the transformation is
√
(1− ρ2)rσ1σ2, and
∫ ∞
B2
∫ B
A
eǫx1p(x1, x2, t) dx1 dx2
=
2
βt
e(a1+ǫ)B1+a2B2+bt
∞∑
n=1
e−r
2
0/2t sin
(
nπθ0
β
)∫
θ
sin
(
nπθ
β
)
gn(θ) dθ
where
gn(θ) =
∫
r
re−r
2/2te[A(θ)+ǫσ1 sin(β−θ)]rI(npi
β
)
(rr0
t
)
dr,
since
cos β = −ρ & sinβ =
√
1− ρ2.
Writing X = x1−B1σ1 and Y =
x2−B2
σ2
then from (12),
X = r
[√
(1− ρ2) cos θ + ρ sin θ
]
(13)
Y = r sin θ
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Since
0 ≤ A−B1
σ1
≤ X ≤ B −B1
σ1
0 ≤ Y ≤ ∞
it follows that
tan θ =
√
1− ρ2
X/Y − ρ, ⇒ θ ∈ [0, β]
and letting
dA =
A−B1
σ1
[√
1− ρ2 cos θ + ρ sin θ
]
dB =
B −B1
σ1
[√
1− ρ2 cos θ + ρ sin θ
] ,
we have dA ≤ r ≤ dB from (13). The result follows.

Derivation of Maturity Payment
From Section 3, the discounted maturity payment, DMP, is:
DMP = e−rfT
∫ ∞
B2
∫ ∞
d
K1p(x1, x2, T ) dx1 dx2 (14)
+ e−rfT
∫ ∞
B2
∫ d
B1
ω1V1(0)e
x1+γ1T p(x1, x2, T ) dx1 dx2 (15)
Using Proposition (A.1) with ǫ = 0, A = d and B = ∞ for line (14) and ǫ = 1, A = B1 and
B = d for line (15), the payment on maturity becomes:
DMP = H1(T )
∞∑
n=1
sin
(
nπθ0
β
)∫ β
0
sin
(
nπθ
β
)
g+n (θ) dθ
+H2(T )
∞∑
n=1
sin
(
nπθ0
β
)∫ β
0
sin
(
nπθ
β
)
g∗n(θ) dθ
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where,
H1(T ) =
2K1e
−rfT
βT
ea1B1+a2B2+bT e−r
2
0/2T
H2(T ) =
2ω1V1(0)e
(γ1−rf )T
βT
e(a1+1)B1+a2B2+bT e−r
2
0/2T
g+n (θ) =
∫ ∞
d∗(θ)
re−r
2/2T eA(θ)rI(npi
β
)
(rr0
T
)
dr
g∗n(θ) =
∫ d∗(θ)
0
re−r
2/2T e[A(θ)+ǫσ1 sin(β−θ)]rI(npi
β
)
(rr0
T
)
dr
d∗(θ) =
d−B1
σ1
[√
1− ρ2 cos θ + ρ sin θ
]
=
lnω1
σ1 sin(θ − β) ≥ 0.
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